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"Might Malcolm Glazer have avoided criticism by changing his
name to Carlyle or Texas Pacific? A private equity firm can, for
example, buy a large stake in a country's former defence research
agency with hardly a peep being uttered. But that's not as sensitive as
a football club. "I
"La proprit , c 'est le vol."
("Property is theft. ')2
I. THE GLOBAL SETTING - LAW, INTERESTS, & CULTURAL
INSTITUTIONS
A. Introduction
Based on the historical origins of sport, two organizational and proprietary
models of professional practice exist. The traditional or universal model is
practiced in Europe, Africa, and most parts of Asia and South America, where
sport is a competitive open league system based on merit and promotion of
clubs. These clubs have roots in the local society but spread their tentacles to
1. Clay Harris Mudlark, Under Reds 'Bed, FIN. TIMES (London), May 17, 2005, at 24.
2. P.J. Proudhon, WHAT IS PROPERTY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLE OF RIGHT AND
GOVERNMENT (1840).
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other parts. Organizational control is vested in an independent national sport
federation that balances the interests of multiple participants. Under this
model, proprietors are as much a part of the club as supporters. Sport is a
multifaceted, socio-democratic institution with aims of education, culture,
entertainment, and entrepreneurism. Then, there is the American model that is
generally practiced in the U.S., Canada, and, in certain American-originated
sports, in South America, Japan, Taiwan, and Korea. Sport is operated in a
closed league system owned by powerful individuals and corporations whose
control of the location of the club, the staff, and the assets is nearly absolute.
Under the American model, sport thrives on the power of commerce to
produce entertainment and to merchandise various services and articles to the
fans. There is no permanent relationship with a team or the supporters. A city
buys a club to stay with it until, perhaps, another club or city outbids the other.
3 In the modem age of globalization, a clash of cultures is bound to occur
once parties cross borders and intrude into another region's sport. 4
The recent controversy involving the payment of £790 million sterling by
Mr. Malcolm Glazer to acquire substantial majority control of Manchester
United FC (ManU), a globally renowned team with strong local roots, listed
on the London Stock Exchange (LSE), captures the unfolding challenges of
sport globalization and the potential clash of cultures. 5 Mr. Glazer, a foreign
resident with no assets in the jurisdiction and no previous football experience,
3. See Lester S. Brooks, Colts Gallop to Indianpolis, in SPORTS AND THE LAW, 233-36 (Charles
E. Quirk ed., 1996); Wayne S. Quirk, Fear, Attack, and Pressure: The Relocation of the Raiders, in
SPORTS AND THE LAW, 224-32 (Charles E. Quirk ed., 1996); see also John McCormick et al.,
Playing Stadium Games, NEWSWEEK, July 14, 1997, at 37; cf Ragan G. Reeves, Note, Franchise
Blackmail and the NFL: What a City Can Do to Keep Its Home Team, 5 TEX. ENT. & SPORTS L.J. 6
(1996).
4. See EDWARD GRAYSON, SPORT AND THE LAW (3d ed. 2000); see also JOHN HORNE ET AL.,
UNDERSTANDING SPORT 276-81 (1999); infra Section I.C.; cf Damaged Goods; American
Capitalism, ECONOMIST, May 21, 2005. See generally RICHARD GIULIANOTTI, SPORT A CRITICAL
SOCIOLOGY 190-210 (2005); BARRIE HOULIHAN, SPORT & SOCIETY 345, 359-60 (2003); JOHN
HUGHSON ET AL., THE USES OF SPORT 106-08 (2005).
5. See Paul J. Davies & Matthew Garrahan, Glazer Claims His United Prize After Irish Tycoons
Sell Their 29% Stake, FIN. TIMES (London), May 13, 2005, § 1, at I [hereinafter Davies & Garrahan,
Glazer Claims his United Prize]; Paul J. Davies & Matthew Garrahan, Glazer Seizes Control of Man
United the US Tycoon Has Rothschild to Thank for the Deal, FIN. TIMES (London), May 13, 2005, at
23 [hereinafter Davies & Garrahan, Glazer Seizes Control]; Paul J. Davies et al., Glazer Tightens
Grip on Man Utd, FIN. TIMES (London), May 14, 2005, at 2; see also David Jones & Siobhan
Kennedy, Glazer Grabs Control of Man U, Makes Bid, TISCALICOM, May 12, 2005,
http://www.tiscali.co.uk/news/newswire.php/news/reuters/2005/05/12/sport/glazergrabscontrolofman
umakesbid.html; What Do You Think of Man Utd Bid?, BBC, May 20, 2005,
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/talking-point/4541487.stm
(containing interesting, diverse, and culturally linked opinions mainly from across North America and
the UK).
2006]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LA W REVIEW
caused consternation among most ManU supporters with his persistent,
aggressive approaches toward acquisition and ownership of ManU shares. 6
Ultimately, Mr. Glazer's controversial, refined, novel, and American-inspired
financial device, called the performance-in-kind (PIK) bond, was an effective
strategy in blowing away resisting shareholders and giving him effective
control. 7 This American corporate and management approach allowed Mr.
Glazer to defy supporters and Manchester City. In England and the rest of
Europe, the PIK bond raised the question of how professional clubs, situated
historically as social institutions and traditionally promoted as a community
asset, would be seen and evaluated. 8 The contrasting responses are captured
by a writer as follows:
A little while ago the fans took to the streets pointing out that
Malcolm Glazer's offer to buy the club involved him running up a lot
of debt, the collateral for which they were providing from future sales
of match tickets. In other words, they were buying the club, and he
would become the owner.
In other societies - and I can think of one across the Atlantic - this
kind of thing is regarded as remarkably clever and worthy of
celebration; the fella's made of the right stuff. It's tough out there,
and this is the way of the world.
Over here in still softly social democratic Europe we regard it as
shocking. 9
The fact that disputes arise is therefore unsurprising. Significantly, where
resistance by ManU supporters is culturally and legally symbolic for England
and the traditional model states, the Glazer enterprise represents the advent of
an untested, American spirit of sport globalization. What becomes important
6. See Ashling O'Connor, Glazer Returns to Haunt United, TIMES (London), Dec. 21, 2004, at
60; Paul Thompson, United Mystery; US Man Linked to Irish Interest, EVENING STANDARD
(London), Mar. 7, 2003, at 84; Nick,Louth, Why Glazer's Man Utd Bid Could Fail, MSN.cOM,
http://www.joinmust.org/forum/showthread.php?t=l 1180&goto--nextnewest (last visited Jan. 24,
2006); cf Davies & Garrahan, Glazer Claims His United Prize, supra note 5; infra Section I. C..
7. See Peter Smith & Gillian Tett, Why an Exotic New Species of Bond Spells Trouble for Hedge
Funds and Man United PIK Debt, a Takeover Tool Used by Private Equity Firms and Malcolm
Glazer, Should Come with a Health Warning, FIN. TIMES (London), May 17, 2005, at 23.
8. According to the company secretary of Shareholders United, "We are opposed to any single
person owning the club .... It is 126 years old and belongs to the community it serves. We are
opposed to anyone who is going to take away the fans' voices." William Hall, Fans Show Their
Objections by Erecting "Not for Sale" Sign, FN. TIMES (London), May 13, 2005, at 23.
9. Peter Chapman, Blog on the Glazer Fiasco, FT.COM, May 13, 2005, http://news.ft.com/
cms/s/lde52228-b7e3-1 1d9-bc7c-00000e251 1c8.html. See Mudlark, supra note 1; What Do You
Think of Man Utd Bid?, supra note 5.
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is the role of law as a tool to reconcile global protests, rights, and interests. 10
B. Scope and Scale of the Law
On its face, the Glazer debacle is an English problem and a matter for the
English authorities. I " There can be no doubt that consequences will result for
ManU, local and national supporters, the sport of football, and the English
Premier League. 12 On the other hand, the parties involved, the ideas at stake,
the worldwide reaction, and the role of international financial lenders evidence
the internationalization of the situation. Transnational legal issues and
consequences also exist. The fate of ManU is bound to have an effect on the
sporting and financial balance sheets of continental European based clubs. 13
Further, the interests, powers, and responsibilities of regional and international
football federations are at stake. 14 In light of these facts, three regulatory
bodies - national, regional, and international - have duties to inquire about the
dispute; to protect, amend, or revoke the transactions; or to promote
reasonable solutions consistent with ISL. 15 The legal rules that will apply are
therefore open, specialized, and inherently transnational. As national English
10. See infra Section I. B.
11. See infra Sections II.B. - ll.D.; cf infra Sections III.B. - III.D.
12. For Man U, the club will be placed under multiple intensive pressures, including sporting
performance, bankruptcy, and unfamiliar political risks. See infra Sections I.B., lI.B. - lI.D., IV.D.
Consequences exist for local and national supporters. See infra Sections IB, II.D. For the sport, it
heralds private takeovers of the Premier League clubs and the community-affiliated clubs. See
generally Man Utd Boost After Nike Warning, BBC, May 30, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/low/football/teams/m/man utd/4591031.stm (reporting apprehension
from kit sponsors as a result of the takeover); Murray Urges Glazer Not to Get Greedy,
FOOTBALL365.COM, May 28, 2005, http://www.football365.co.uk/
Print.page/index.shtml!REDIR?153592 (reporting the views of Sunderland Chairman, Bob Murray,
on broadcasting rights to Premier League competitions and the sport as whole).
13. To the extent ManU's sporting performance fades, commercial partners and sponsorship fees
paid for international competitions may decrease. Revenue and income from gate takings and transfer
fees are generally increased when ManU is involved.
14. Such stakes include: (1) choosing not to follow broadcast rights practices, (2) leading or
participating in breaking out of established competitions, or (3) undertaking business activities
inconsistent with the social and educational functions of sport, such as gambling and edgy video
games. See David Smith, NFL Questions Glazer Casino Link, SPORTBUSINESS.COM, May 25, 2005,
http://www.sportbusiness.com/news/index?region-global&newsitemid=157629 (reporting that the
National Football League (NFL) has asked Tampa Bay Buccaneers owner Malcolm Glazer to explain
ManU's links to a Las Vegas casino). Another possibility is that it opens a wider door for a feared
Americanized invasion of the sport market in Europe and other parts of the globe, with consequences
on the present balance of power between clubs, National Sport Federations (NSFs), and International
Sport Federations (ISFs). Finally, there are bound to be novel problems of inter-jurisdictional
conflicts between various regional and national authorities. See Rob Hughes, Liverpool Get Euro Go-
Ahead, SUNDAY TIMES (London), May 29, 2005, Sport, at 1.
15. See GRAYSON, supra note 4, at 353-54; cf infra Section III.
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law does not solely, exclusively, or clearly apply,' 6 ISL, as the applicable
transnational law, will take into consideration mandatory rules and practices,
including local customs and financial rules and practices affecting the
relationship with England. 17 A much more difficult question is the nature of
the rights claimed and their recognition under national law. The relationship,
functions, and responsibilities exercised by Manchester-based supporters is
cognizable as a "community sport related right" in ManU protected with full
or quasi-proprietary connotations. 18 This is in line with an authoritative
exposition that:
The law of property incorporates a series of critical value judgments,
reflecting the cultural norms, the social ethics and the political
economy prevalent in any given community. It is inevitable that
property law should serve in this way as a vehicle for ideology, for
"property" has commonly been the epithet used to identify that which
people most greatly value. 19
All other supporters and parties are able to exercise their claims under
ISL. In light of the applicable regime being transnational law, it is pertinent to
consider the most important, relevant ISL rules and doctrines that apply to
English and non-English interests. 20
Fundamental Doctrines: The Commerce and Access Doctrines
The right of Mr. Glazer to invest in ManU is not in doubt in view of ISL's
commerce doctrine.21 The commerce doctrine promotes international sport
transactions, irrespective of the parties' nationalities. Mr. Glazer is within his
right to rely on the doctrine to promote the commercial development of sport.
No national or international football authorities, fans, or supporters can prima
16. There is no per se composite English law of sport. On the other hand, where a specific
statute governs a particular relationship between parties that are residents of England, English law
would be invoked. Cf infra Section III.D.
17. See infra Sections L.C, I.D., III.C.
18. "New property" based theories recognizing participation rights that are vested under custom
or usage suffice to grant recognition and protection. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE
L.J. 733 (1964). See DAVID CONN, THE FOOTBALL BUSINESS FAIR GAME IN THE '90s? 29-48
(1997) (containing a history of ManU and the role of Manchester society in developing the club);
KEVIN GRAY & SUSAN FRANCIS GRAY, ELEMENTS OF LAND LAW 100-10 (4th ed. 2005) (discussing
the scope for a wide legal definition of property in common law).
19. GRAY & GRAY, supra note 18, at 102-03. See William N. R. Lucy, Hegel on Private
Property and Public Access, in PROPERTY PROBLEMS FROM GENES TO PENSION FUNDS 274-89 (J.W.
Harris ed., 1997).
20. See infra Section I.B.
21. Cf infra Sections I.C.
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facie stop him from participating in European or international football. 22
Similarly, ManU supporters have a right to participate in football related
activities. The participative interest or right is historically rooted in non-
American jurisdictions. 23 It is also supported by the access doctrine of ISL. 24
While the participative right may manifest in holding shares in the club of
choice, the exercise or recognition of the right is not based on shareholding.
Supporters have valid legal rights that must be taken into consideration. 25
Nonetheless, the doctrines recognize that any commercial or participative
interest leading to acquisition of ownership rights must be subject to the "best
interest of the sport" and the "good of the game" powers of the supervising
authorities. 26
Fundamental Doctrines: The Olympism and Fair Play Doctrines
The Olympism doctrine broadly regulates international and inter-personal
relationships in sport.27  The doctrine permeates boundaries to address
personal, commercial, and social aspects of society; promotes fraternity
notwithstanding conflicting socio-cultural systems by emphasizing culture and
fair play as an integral character of human interrelationship; and,
consequently, rejects abuses of self and others. It thus fathers working
concepts such as the "sport family" and "abuse of sport rights." Olympism is
22. Cf Jonathan Wilson, Terrace Taunts Mark New Era as Old Rivals Put the Boot in, FIN.
TIMES (London), May 14, 2005, at 2.
23. Recently, in spite of the interests of the club's manager, supporters of top Premier League
club, Birmingham FC, opposed and prevailed in a decision that would have allowed Mr. Lee Bowyer,
a controversial football player, to join the club. See infra Section IV.C. (discussing supporters' part in
commercial activities); see also CONN, supra note 18; Hall, supra note 8.
24. The doctrine promotes the right of every person to maximally participate in all aspects of
sport.
25. Due to financial and other contributions to the development of their teams and the final
spectacle, supporters are a higher ranking of volunteers. Volunteers have formal recognition in sport
law. In Watson v. Prager, Mr. Justice Scott acknowledged the interests of the participants, as well as
the interests of the public as a basis for regulation. 3 Eng. Rep. 487, 493 (Ch. 1991). See generally
ROGAN TAYLOR, FOOTBALL AND ITS FANS (Stehpen Wagg & John Williams eds., 1992); Reeves,
supra note 3, at 8 (discussing how fan loyalty is taken into consideration by a court to prevent
franchise location).
26. See FIFA STATUTES, art. 2(e) (2005), available at
http://www.fifa.com/documents/static/regulations/Statutes 09_2005_EN.pdf (stating that one of the
duties of the Fd~ration Intemationale de Football Association (FIFA) is to prevent the introduction
of improper methods and abuses in the sport); see also David F. Dolan, George Steinbrenner's Bronx
Zoo, in SPORTS AND THE LAW 92-96 (Charles E. Quirk ed., 1996); M. Philip Lucas, Commissioner
Kuhn Victorious over Owner Finley, in SPORTS AND THE LAW 88-91 (Charles E. Quirk ed., 1996).
27. See INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, OLYMPIC CHARTER 9 (2004); see also Editorial,
Quotations by Juan Antonio Samaranch, OLYMPIC REV. (June - July 2001), available at
http://www.olympic.org/upload/news/olympicreview/review_200219124232-UK.pdf.
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a juridical resource to provide equitable and conscionable behavior for peace
and harmony while reinforcing self-improvement and self-competition.
28
Furthermore, Olympism promotes independence of the sport movement from
commercial sectors. Under this doctrine, Mr. Glazer's interests are protected
and promoted, as long as they are neither impractical nor a charade.
Implicitly, if the interests offend Olympism or the spirit of fair play, they must
be rejected. The same measures equally apply to activities of supporters
opposed to Mr. Glazer.
C. Globalization of Sport Agendas
Clearly from the above doctrines, ISL promotes the free development and
exercise of globalization strategies in sport. Subject to compliance with
mandatory, fundamental rules, corporations, individuals, and supporters have
autonomous powers, duties, and rights. The ManU takeover presents an
interesting opportunity for parties to exercise their individual and group policy
visions.
Globalization of Sport and the Glazers' Interests
It has been noted that: "Manchester United has a fixed home city and
stadium, but its [fifty] million global fan base means that, in theory, it could
play "home" games anywhere in England, or even East Asia." 29 The Glazers'
interests in acquiring ManU have little to do with being "long-term sports
investors and avid Manchester United fans." 30  Their substantial pre-
acquisition shareholding consistently delivered healthy profits. Since no
American sport has the global support that football does, the prime motive is
to establish the Glazers' business prowess into international sport through
ownership of the globally supported ManU brand. 31  This reach could
permanently be exported to the U.S. with maximum effect. In Europe, Asia,
and the Middle East, the Glazers would be able to maximize the potential of
28. See INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, supra note 27.
29. GIULIANOTrI, supra note 4, at 198.
30. See Glazer Lifts Manchester United Stake to 74.8 Pct, HOME.EIRCOM.NET, May 13, 2005,
http://home.eircom.net/content/reuters/sportsextra/5553087?view-Eircomnet; see also Gold Trafford:
Foreign Investors See Value in British Football Clubs, FIN. TIMES (London), May 14, 2005, at 10;
Nils Pratley & Daniel Taylor, Glazer May Refloat United in Three Years, GUARDIAN (London), May
17, 2005, at 36; Paul Sullivan, Tampa Owner Can Turn a Buck, FIN. TIMES (London), May 13 2005,
at 23.
31. See James M. Gladden & Daniel C. Funk, Developing an Understanding of Brand
Associations in Team Sport: Empirical Evidence from Consumers of Professional Sport, 16 J. SPORT
MGMT. 54, 54-81 (2002).
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football as the regional, dominate, and lucrative sport. Consequently, it
therefore makes perfect sense to covet the acquisition of a leading brand as a
strategic asset in a globally growing market.
Globalization of Sport and the Supporters' Interests
Special attention must be directed toward local supporters who oppose the
sale or takeover of ManU. It is easy, because of the fierce and virulent
language employed, to describe Mancunians or English opponents as
parochial, nationalist, anti-American, or anti-globalization supporters. 32 At
least in sporting terms, these descriptions would be inaccurate and unfair.
Manchester has quietly built a successful image as a global sporting city by
bidding for the Olympic Games in 1996 and 2000, hosting the Commonwealth
Games in 2002, and contributing to the success of ManU as a global football
brand. In general, sport significantly contributes to the local economy. Where
aggressive, one-man bids for its premier selling point are considered "fair" to
only shareholders, 33 it is clearly a responsible and justifiable self interest for
the wider community to evaluate commercial and political risks associated
with Mr. Glazer's takeover or to take alternative measures. 34 It is of course
possible that the Glazers will relocate the club's "Old Trafford" headquarters
to the U.S. or, under sweet financial terms, transfer some sporting activities to
the U.S. or elsewhere. In these and other arrangements, the Manchester
community of stakeholders and shareholders will lose out to globalization.
The only fair conclusion that may be reached is that most Mancunians would
be receptive to foreign investment with a glocalisation agenda. Thereby, the
proprietors would strive to achieve a maximized global, commercial potential
without any harmful social and economic effects on the club and the city.
Thus, "the stranger must bring no fear, but bring good tidings."35
32. Mr. Glazer has been described as a "parasite." Man Utd Fans Vow to Fight Takeover,
CNN.COM, May 13, 2005, http://cnn.com/2005/SPORT/football/O5/13/united.glazer/index.html.
Focus on the nationalities of major selling shareholders as "Irish" and "Scottish" who are described as
traitors may be noted. See What Do You Think of the Man Utd Bid?, supra note 5.
33. See Manchester Dis-United, SKY.COM, May 12, 2005, http://www.sky.com/skynews/
article/0,, 30400-1181626,00.html.
34. See HUGHSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 54-55; ef infra Sections II.C. - II.D., IV.B. - I.D.
35. See Nick Harris, Glazer Plans to Raise Ticket Prices by 54%, INDEP. (London), June 10,
2005, at 72; Andrew Hodgson, Glazer Ticket Plans Spark Fans' Anger, EVENING STANDARD
(London), June 10, 2005, at 46; cf infra Section V.
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D. Globalization of Sport in National Law
The Limited Impact of Corporatization
Due to ManU's public limited company and capital market statuses, it is at
first easy to dismiss supporters' concerns with the view that Mr. Glazer's
acquisition of nearly all the shares will mean that less shareholders will be
affected and that any dispute concerns only shareholders. 36 But this theory is
missing vital points. To dye-in the wool, Anglo-American bred corporate
lawyers and pragmatists, it may come as a rude shock to realize that the stock
market is not the final judge of sporting matters. 37 The final regulators in
football are the Football Association (FA) and the Premier League, which
work under FIFA rules and ISL. If this was otherwise, the organization of
sport would be fractured by inconsistent regulatory standards. 38 Universally,
the special nature of sport business and its departure from pure business
sectors is well acknowledged, so that it has a distinctive institutional base.
Sport is too serious and ethical to be left to speculators and capitalists.39 The
commercialization of football in particular, and sport in general, cannot be
decided by stock market rules. Mr. Samaranch, the then IOC president, said:
"We shall serve sport not use. Money generated by sport shall benefit sport.
Sport shall remain in control of its own destiny .... We must not let young
athletes lose their freedom and become dependent on agents who determine
where, and against whom, they should compete." 40 The vital power of
national and international sport federations to intervene on behalf of the best
interest of the sport and for the good of the game is inherent. Intervention
need not be based on a shareholding right, as this raises conflict of interest
issues. 41 Taking into consideration that FIFA does not admire capital
marketization of sporting clubs, shareholding interests are unnecessary for
36. Jonathan Michie, Bankrupt the Firm and Save the Club: The Manchester United Takeover
Reflects a Deeper Corporate Malaise, GUARDIAN (London), May 17, 2005, at 26.
37. See Martin Dickson, Glazer 1- Man U Fans 0, FIN. TIMES (London), May 13, 2005, at 22;
see also What Do You Think of the Man Utd Bid?, supra note 5.
38. This would have adverse sporting and economic consequences. See infra Section III.D.; cf
Hughes, supra note 14.
39. See Mudlark, supra note 1; see also PHILIP AUGAR, THE GREED MERCHANTS (2005);
Stephen Weatherill, Sport as Culture in European Community Law, in CULTURE AND EUROPEAN
UNION LAW 113-52 (Rachael Craufurd Smith ed., 2004); Richard Lambert, Are Wall Street's Ethics
Dead?, TIMES (London), Oct. 8, 2002, at 7; cf Joshua Chaffm, Enigma Treats Sport as Pure
Business, FIN. TIMES (London), May 14, 2005, at 2; Robert Shrimsley, Glazing over as Malcolm
Strikes, FIN. TIMES (London), May 17, 2005, at 18.
40. Editorial, supra note 27.
41. See Michie, supra note 36.
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national authorities. 42 The power to intervene is based on the proprietary right
of management of leagues and competitions, a centralized hierarchy of
control, and an institutional independence of concerned football authorities.
The Impact of Universal Interest on National Law
While local opposition to Mr. Glazer's raid was foreseeable, the global
span and pedigree of objectors is astonishing. Fanatical supporters have more
or less the same intensity as opposers, ordinary local and foreign supporters,
reputable and decent academics, 43 past and present ManU players,44
bankers, 45 and other professionals. With an understanding and appreciation of
an espirit d'equip, there is something sad about the takeover. Supporters
cannot call it their own club. 46 Professionals, academicians, and everybody
else will have to redefine their relationship with the club as simply one man's
property. 47 Notable among those with mild or qualified support for the
takeover are Mr. Mourinho of Chelsea FC 48 and Mr. Arsene Wenger of
Arsenal FC, both managers of rival football clubs. 49 Mr. Mourinho, in the
words of Mr. Wenger, manager of an "economically doped" team,50 has
declared his hand. He wants to serially humiliate ManU under Sir Alex
42. See Josephine Cumbo & Paul J. Davies, Shareholders Delighted as Tycoon Puts Club in a
League of Its Own: Malcolm Glazer Has Helped to Deliver a Market Performance United Failed to
Match on the Field, FIN. TIMES (London), May 14, 2005, at 3 (discussing the general failure of capital
market performance of English clubs, other than Man. U); Ashling O'Connor, Blatter Censures Clubs
for Sale of Shares, TIMES (London), Apr. 1 9, 2003, at 38 (reporting on Mr. Sepp Blatter's objections
to the practice on the basis that it forces clubs to invest more shareholders' funds thus funneling
spending).
43. See Jonathan Northcroft & William Lewis, Nomura Backs Man Utd Fans to Block Glazer
Bid, TIMES ONLINE, May 1, 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/printFriendly/0,,1-528-1592393-
528,00.html.
44. Notable opponents are former captain, Eric Cantona, and super sub, Ole Gunner Skoijer. See
O'Connor, supra note 6.
45. See, e.g., O'Connor, supra note 6.
46. Unless, of course, Mr. Glazer is charitable and addresses supporters' interests. See infra Part
V.B. This may be contrasted to the U.S., where supporters are psychologically adjusted for a possible
relocation. Cf Brooks, supra note 3; McCormick, supra note 3; Reeves, supra note 3.
47. On this account, I for one, wonder why, other than perhaps a genuine love for sport, I am
writing about this or giving positive hints, particularly as I was, and am, not a supporter of ManU or
in fact any other club.
48. Mourinho Urges Fergie to Stay, X-STREAM.COM, May 14, 2005, http://www.x-
stream.co.uk/sport/365/football/news/2005/05/14/news_152356.html.
49. Give Glazer a Chance, Says Arsenal Boss Wenger, ESPNSTAR.COM, May 14, 2005,
http://www.espnstar.com/epl/eplnewsdetail_1512166.html.
50. Mr. Wenger was referring to the financial muscle of Chelsea FC, as a result of the patron-
owner role of Mr. Abramovich. See id.
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Ferguson, the greatest manager in the English game, becoming, with Chelsea
FC, the alpha male lion in the pack. This could, of course, be possible when
the club, under heavy pressure from a new regime, supporters, and sporting is
traumatized, as it will be in coming years. Mr. Wenger is comparable to the
fox inviting hens to stay to play the "game of survival" in the coming rain. It
knows rescuers will not hear their cries and that they will not be swift in
motion. Thus, the sporting consequence and global interest confirm that a
formal, localized approach is severely limited, being impacted by extra-
territorial forces.
E. Conclusion
Modem relations reveal a complex setting for proprietary and
entrepreneurial sport practice. Greater commercial opportunities exist now
than ever before so that sport practice assumes a more internationalized fabric.
Three points emerge. First, international practice in sport has been hastened
by globalization, which, by its nature, is a dynamic, yet aggressive process of
wealth accumulation and distribution. Pre-existing ISL norms contain
doctrines on commerce, access, Olympism, and fair play, which, while
promoting commerce, restrain the conduct of participants. These norms
naturally regulate sport globalization, for which no additional legal rules have
been created. Second, globalization also has the effect of pitching parties in
contesting camps, as the ManU takeover situation effectively demonstrates.
On the other hand, ISL is able to promote commerce without inflicting damage
or friction on stakeholders. Resort to national law will be effective only if
states regulate sport practice. Examinations of territorial and corporate
structures have to be analyzed, and in the UK, a negative result suggests
limitations. Third, due to formal limitations of national law, challenges to
sport globalization are undertaken within states' territories by aggrieved
persons. On the other hand, the role of ISL as the applicable transnational law
is reinforced. This latter point will be validated by a detailed examination of
the impact of the Glazers' takeover of ManU in the next part of this article.
II.TRANSACTIONAL OBJECTIONS, RISKS, AND CONSEQUENCES
A. Introduction
The protests against the style of Mr. Glazer, as well as the novelty and
strategies of the acquisition, make it necessary to assess the procedural
integrity of the transactions, compliance with applicable fundamental rules of
sport law, and the impact and risks on the shareholders, the club, and the
[Vol. 16:2
THE "THEATER OF DREAMS"?
country. These will be discussed below.
B. Acquisition, Representation, and Impact
A combination of procedural and substantive issues involving
representation, process, outcome, and impact of the acquisition arise.
Representations prior to the takeover are material. In the course of concerns
about his share buying build-up, Mr. Glazer was reported to have made a
statement that he was content with his shareholding and had "no current
intention of making an offer for the club." 5 1 Messrs. J.P. McManus and John
Magnier, the other major shareholders, declared also that they were "long term
investors." 52 These statements were warranties that they would not buy or sell
unless it was absolutely in the best interest of the club or if the club was not
doing particularly well. 53 Neither of the conditions occurred to make the
buyer and sellers go back on their words. On the other hand, supporters and
other concerned shareholders apparently relied on them. 54 What subsequently
happened prior to the final charge was that Mr. Glazer garnered more funds
and fine-tuned his approach to obtain the support or surrender of the few that
mattered. It is noteworthy that Messrs. McManus and Magnier have not
issued any statement about the "best interest of the club" in relation to the sale.
With regard to the process of the takeover, it is understood that Mr. Glazer
succeeded in his bid for effective control because the price of the acquisition
was "very attractive" and "over-leveraged. ' 55 This coincides with the first of
two major grievances by opponents on the real nature and sources of the
capital. It is being suggested that, in conformity with Stock Exchange rules,
the Board of Directors had no choice other than to surrender. 56 The fact that
an "exotic" financial product based on borrowed funds was used to buy the
shares amounts to a de facto case of "economic doping" a la Arsene Wenger.
51. Glazer Rules out Imminent Bid for United, TIMES ONLINE, Mar. 30, 2004,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,27-1056639,00.html.
52. Messrs. J.P. McManus and John Magnier, horse racing millionaires who owned twenty-nine
percent of the shares, consistently put forward claims of long term interests. Cf Davies & Garrahan,
Glazer Claims His United Prize, supra note 5; Thompson, supra note 6.
53. Davies & Garrahan, Glazer Claims His United Prize, supra note 5 (reporting that the reaction
by the spokesman for "Shareholders United" was that: "This was a treacherous act of betrayal"). See
also Thompson, supra note 6.
54. See Davies & Garrahan, Glazer Claims His United Prize, supra note 5; Matthew Garrahan,
Man Utd Plays Down Takeover Talk, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 2, 2003, at 21.
55. Davies & Garrahan, Glazer Claims His United Prize, supra note 5.
56. See Davies & Garrahan, Glazer Seizes Control, supra note 5. Where there are wider
interests, and these plainly exist (see supra Section I.B.; infra Parts I.C. - lI.D.), there may be a duty
to refuse. See infra Part III.D.
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It is therefore unsurprising that the traditional investor supporters were
disadvantaged. Interestingly, under national laws, rules on funding and
acquiring shares in modem companies are influenced by attempts to prevent
morally objectionable schemes, avoid creating a false market in a company's
shares, prevent asset stripping, and prevent other malpractices by directors,
shareholders, or the company. 57 Alone, or in conjunction with the applicable
national law, it is justifiable to invoke the ISL doctrine for two reasons. First,
it appears that the fundamental duty under ISL to engage in fair play, vis a vis
the club and opposed minority shareholders, has been breached by the
acquisitive approach.58 Second, as the best interests of the sport and the club
must be considered and served, any decision that does not consider these is
voidable.
The outcome of the takeover is the second major source of grievance by
opponents. 59 Analysts all agree that ManU has been put on a steep and
slippery financial slope. 60 Indeed, the ownership interests in ManU are now
complicated as a result of the sponsored funding. 61 It has been reported that
"Manchester United will clearly be in a weaker position financially." 62 The
fact that the debt will ultimately have to be largely borne or repaid by a
57. See Gerard McCormack, Compulsory Expropriation and Company Law, in PROPERTY
PROBLEMS FROM GENES TO PENSION FUNDS 61-77 (J.W. Harris ed., 1997); Eddy Wymeersch, Anite
23 of the Second Company Law Directie The Prohibition on FinancialAssistance to Acquire Sharea of the Company in ULRICH DROBNIG ET
AL., FESTSCHRIFT FUR ULRICH DROBNIG ZUM SIEBZIGSTEN GEBURTSTAG 725-47 (1998). See
generally Sheldon Leader, Private Property and Corporate Governance, in PERSPECTIVES ON
COMPANY LAW 85-113 (Fiona Macmillan Patfield ed., 1995).
58. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, CODE OF SPORT ETHICS (2001), available at
http://cm.coe.int/ta/rec/1992/92rl4rev.htm (discussing "fair play" in commercial relations in sport).
The CODE OF SPORT ETHICS provides that "fair play is essential for successful promotion,
development and involvement in sport." Id. It is a concept associated with "exploitation, unequal
opportunities, excessive commercialization and corruption." Id. See INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR
THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
CONTRACTS, art. 1.7 (2004) (discussing the equivalent rule as good faith and fair dealing in
transnational commercial relations); see also Leader, supra note 57; McCormack, supra note 57;
Wymeersch, supra note 57.
59. See Davies & Garrahan, Glazer Claims His United Prize, supra note 5; cf infra Sections
II.C. - II.D.
60. See Robert Cole, Little Margin for Error with So Much Debt, TIMES (London), June 10,
2005, at 9 [hereinafter Cole, Little Margin]; Robert Cole, £88m Interest Round the Club's Neck,
TIMES (London), June 11, 2005, at 116 [hereinafter Cole, £88m Interest]; Red Devils Poised to
Plunge into the Red, EPOCH TIMES (London), May 16, 2005, at 24; Smith & Tett, supra note 7;
Gillian Tett, Risky PIKs Make Their Return, FIN. TIMES (London), May 17, 2005, at 23.
61. See also Ingrid Mansell, The Men Who Funded the Deal, TIMES (London), June 11, 2005, at
116; cf Davies & Garrahan, Glazer Claims His United Prize, supra note 5; Davies et al., supra note
5; Smith & Tett, supra note 7;.
62. Red Devils Poised to Plunge into the Red, supra note 60 (quoting Bill Gerrard, professor of
Sports Management and Finance at the Leeds University Business School).
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"captive audience" of herd-like supporters raises serious ethical concerns
about the compliance with and enforcement of ISL fair play policy.63 The ISL
position, establishing a fundamental policy objective of transparency of
ownership interests, is crucial to the rights and interests of supporters.
64
Ownership right to commercial property, which in this case is owning ManU,
may be impossible if it is fundamentally incompatible with the advantage of
non-ownership. 65 Furthermore, football's rules provide that it must remain a
sport.66 This is supported by the policy against excessive commercialization
under ISL. 67 There can be little doubt that Mr. Glazer's highly irregular
approach could be considered an infringement. The application of these rules
and policies would be in conformity with the "best interest of the sport"
doctrine. 68 Taking into account that ISL's Olympism doctrine calls for the
highest ethical standards, there is, in principle, a case for proprietary and
contractual nullification or remedies in restitution for excessive profit made by
certain shareholders.
The identified concerns and experiences create a basis for juridical
expression and application of a fundamental ISL rule on hostile or quasi-
hostile takeovers where parties in sport transactions engage in a takeover
funded by debts that will do the following: (1) leave an efficient and profitable
sport company in a risky situation, 69 (2) take out shareholder supporters who
63. See Cole, Little Margin, supra note 60; Ashling O'Connor, Glazer's Ticket to Ride Adds Fuel
to Fans' Fury, TIMES (London), June 11, 2005, at 116; see also COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 58.
64. Applied and enforced under the United European Football Association (UEFA) rule in AEK
v. UEFA, CAS 98/200 (1999). See Mansell, supra note 61 (stating three names and contents of
security rights to give the option to disclosed corporations to purchase thirty percent of the equity in
2010). The bases for this relate to the public nature of sport, the need for security, the interests of
supporters, the integrity of ownership, etc. Cf Nils Pratley, Arsenal Shoulder More Debt Than
Glazer's United, GUARDIAN (London), May 17, 2005, at 35 (stating the existence of preference
shareholders in ManU comprised of three secretive American hedge funds); Americans Bid for Man
Utd, TVNZ.COM, Oct. 5, 2004, http://tvnz.co.nz/view/page/506420/451462.
65. Property interests are subject to the best interest of the sport, which include the supporters,
maintenance of fair sporting rivalries, the reduction of sporting imbalance based on economic
concentration of wealth, etc. Cf Smith & Tett, supra note 7 (stating that the investment of the
purchase of ManU through PIK bond is claimed to leave bondholders with limited recovery and rank
them behind high priority debt claims, including trade creditors). See Michie, supra note 36 (stating a
business and institutional organizational case against the acquisition of ManU by Mr. Glazer).
66. See FIFA STATUTES, supra note 26, at art. 2(e).
67. See generally COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 58; INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE,
supra note 27, at 2; UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL SCIENTIFIC & CULTURAL ORGANIZATION,
INTERNATIONAL CHARTER OF PHYSICAL EDUCATION AND SPORT, art. 7(1) (1978).
68. Cf Robin Jacobs, Trade Marks and the Olympic Games Throughout the Years, 23
EUROPEAN INTELL. PROP. REV. 1, 5 (2001).
69. Cf infra Section II.C. - I.D.
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oppose the takeover on principled rational economic grounds,7" (3) replace,
either actually or potentially, the interests of displaced shareholders with that
of the funders, 71 (4) provide the new interests holders with no responsibility
or interest in the primary objects of the company, 72 and (5) place the risk of
the debt in an unethical or non-commercial way, either on the innocent class or
the government, 73 which will render the transaction subject to revision or
nullification in the best interests of the sport by the competent authority. This
formulation is consistent with FIFA's duty to prevent the introduction of
improper methods or practices and abuses in the sport.7 4
C. Commercial Risks
In buying out other shareholders with funded debt and converting the club
into a private company, Mr. Glazer could be seen as preparing a hanging
noose for himself in two ways. First, the risk of failure in running European
football clubs is quite high. Second, the nature and determination of
opposition is intense. It has been reported that supporters are burning their
season ticket forms 75 and calling for the boycott of ManU products and the
club's sponsors. 76 In so far as the club remains a public limited company,
with a substantial minority opposed to Glazer, there are post-acquisition risks
that are not in the shareholders' and club's best interests. If these principled
efforts are by a decent degree successful, not only will less money go into the
sport overall, but the wider community of merchants, whose businesses are
built around ManU's supporters and businesses, will also carry heavy losses.
D. Political Risks
Since sport seeks to disassociate itself from geographical and racial
politics and promote integration and peace, the consequences of the takeover
70. Cf infra Section IV.D.
71. See infra Section IV.D.; see also supra Section I.D.
72. See supra Section I.D.
73. See supra Section I.D.
74. FIFA STATUTES, supra note 26, at art. 2(e).
75. Davies & Garrahan, Glazer Claims His United Prize, supra note 5.
76. See Peter Thai Larsen, Gardner's Wrath Falls on JPMorgan, FIN. TIMES (London), May 17,
2005, at 23 (reporting that the chairman of ManU, who is also on the board of top UK companies,
vowed to severe ties with JPMorgan based on the bank's role); Michie, supra note 36; David Owen,
Angry Fans Target Main Sponsors, FIN. TIMES (London), May 14, 2005, at 2; Man Utd Fans Vow to
Fight Takeover, supra note 32 (quoting a fan stating "[i]f that means starving ourselves, and starving
the club of income, in order to make this parasite detach himself from us, then so be it"); see also
Cole, Little Margin, supra note 60; O'Connor, supra note 63.
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need to be assessed in terms of establishing and maintaining the Olympic
ideal. Realistically assessed, the political risks are not negligible enough to be
ignored. For the first time, we have football terrorists with global reach. 77
Mr. Glazer and his team have been the first of the victims of a bombardment
of emails, faxes, and what not.78 Extending the unglamorous fate reserved for
American presidents, mainly by Palestinians, Iranians, Iraqis, and Muslim
protesters, Mr. Glazer's effigy is regularly burnt or hung.79 Perhaps if
voodoo-supporting ManU fans from Haiti, Togo, and the Republic of Benin
get involved, things may get worse for the Glazer family. 80 Also, cruel
difficulties that create risks may arise due to the American and Jewish identity
of Mr. Glazer as the sole proprietor.81 It is not clear what the impact of these
factors will be in the Arab and Muslim world markets, but it appears that
under Taliban and Al-Qaeda influence, those who align with ManU in Islamic
77. See Michael Morgan, Rebels Cop It, SUN (London), May 18, 2005, at 60 (discussing a police
warning to shareholder opposition group that had threatened an "appetite for pure pandemonium");
Ashling O'Connor, Hardliners State Intent in Glazer Campaign, TIMES (London), Feb. 9, 2005, at 80
(discussing the identification of the Manchester Education Committee with loyalist paramilitary
rooted tactics); see also David Rae, £25m Fund to Fight Investor Terrorism, ACCOUNTANCY AGE,
July 39, 2004, at 3; Adrian Warner, Glazer Hides Behind the Law to Protect Himself from Fans,
EVENING STANDARD (London), May 20, 2005, at 83. One group, the so-called Manchester Education
Committee issued a veiled threat reported as follows:
Certain elements of United support are currently being kept in check, but the Committee can give no
guarantee of this in the long term.... The Committee's intelligence network has been compiling dossiers
over recent months ready to implement Operation Uranus, the result of which will render the club
ungovernable. All senior figures within the club are considered "fair game." All such intelligence will be
disseminated to maximum detrimental effect. The Committee has no intention of, nor any necessity to,
race into hasty actions. The deed is now done. The payback will be immense.
Nick Harris, Gill Ignores Militant Movement to Join Glazers, INDEP.
(London), June 10, 2005, at 70.
78. See O'Connor, supra note 77; Kevin Reed, Directors Rush for Protection, ACCOUNTANCY
AGE, Oct. 21, 2004; Warner, supra note 77 (discussing that claims of "violence of intimidation" laws
designed to protect animal lab scientists from activists have been invoked to prevent disclosure of Mr.
Glazer's addresses); Glazer Lifts Manchester United Stake to 74.8 Pct, supra note 30 (detailing a
report that indicates that a 100 person strong protest gang invaded a party hosted by JPMorgan
bankers who acted for Mr. Glazer); see also Damian Wild, Tough to Tackle, ACCOUNTANCY AGE,
Oct. 21, 2004.
79. See Manchester Dis-United, supra note 33.
80. So far, it has been reported that in Manchester "[s]ome fans sang 'Die Glazer Die' to the tune
of 'She'll be Coming Round the Mountain."' Hall, supra note 8. See also O'Connor, supra note 77
(reporting that a direct warning was sent to Mr. Joel Glazer stating that "no matter how large the
phalanx of bodyguards you bring, Joel, we will always outnumber you").
81. See O'Connor, supra note 77 (reporting the burning of the American flag and the promise of
a dirty war); see also Eric Collier, Ajax and the Jewish Issue, AJAXUSA.COM, Feb. 16, 2005,
www.ajax-usa.com/desk/ajax-and-the-jewish-issue.html; Simon Kuper, "We're Hunting the Jews!'
Yells Inside the Stadium, AJAXUSA.COM, http://www.ajax-usa.com/history/kuper/we-re-hunting-the-
jews.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2006); cf Damaged Goods; American Capitalism, supra note 4.
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hotbed countries may equally be victims. The recent experiences of Ajax FC
in the Netherlands should give cause for concern for non-politicized English
football clubs and fans in Europe. 82 To stem supporters' flight and reduce
violence, the President of Ajax FC recently had to deny claims of being a
Jewish club, particularly after certain Dutch clubs' supporters claimed to be
associated with the militant group, Hamas. 83
E. Conclusion - Evaluation of Risks and Interests
Critical analysis suggests that the transaction process is flawed and that
the Glazer acquisition lies open to legal attack or undermining risks. At the
same time, there are serious commercial and political risks. In rectifying or
preventing further damage, several noses will be bloodied. Under these
analyses, conceivable plans of asking ManU to promote or participate in
global initiatives must now be thoroughly revised, if not thrown into the
cooler. ManU's existing and prospective goodwill could be lost to the usual
Italian, Spanish, or German suspects; some other clubs from France, Portugal,
or Russia; or an English rising star club like Chelsea FC. It is open to debate
whether, barring laches, it would be possible to unravel the transaction, annul
the transfer, cancel the shares, or force those who profited at the shareholders'
expense to regurgitate their profits. On the other hand, with their previous
stake, the Glazers have the power to work within the system to achieve
financial and sporting rewards for all. 84 Clearly, for all sides involved,
something must be done in the "best interests of the club and the sport."
However, in achieving this goal, the response and role of UK institutions is
very vital and should first be examined. 85
III. TERRITORIAL COMPETENCE AND LAXITY
A. Introduction
As the center of focal activity and protests, the role of UK institutions is
vital. A "laxitude," arising from laxity and an attitude of indifference in
officialdom, may be observed as relevant institutions with general or specific
powers to intervene, ask questions, or conditionalize the operations of
82. See Kuper, supra note 81.
83. Collier, supra note 81; Craig S. Smith, Ajax's Jewish Identity Turns Sinister, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 29, 2005, at 1.
84. Cf infra Section V.
85. Cf infra Section III.
304 [Vol. 16:2
THE "THEATER OF DREAMS"?
participants when the best interest of the sport have consistently not done so.
The various reasons and consequences of laxitude will be discussed below.
B. The UK Government and Manchester City Council
Historically, with the aims of prevention of violence and consumer
protection, in matters concerning fans, security, and consumer protection, the
UK government has legally intervened in sporting matters and their
organizations. 86 Also, the promotion of access to sport is implemented
piecemeal through various policy formulation and implementation agencies. 87
With respect to commercialization and ownership crises, the UK government
has been active. 88 However, compared to the disquiet in government circles
when, in 1998, Mr. Rupert Murdoch launched his fan-led, foiled bid for
ManU, there was a noticeable silence this time. Then, perceptive observers
felt they could hear the steely objection silently made by British Prime
Minister, Mr. Tony Blair, a ManU supporter. In the recent May 5, 2005
general elections, Sir Alex Ferguson, ManU manager and opponent of the raid,
endorsed and campaigned for a Labour victory among the club's large
supporters. It appears that there may be no political or ethical reciprocity this
time from the government, even if it appears that there will be political risks. 89
Not to be carelessly dismissed as a beer parlor analysis, is a view that the
acquisition sum is a significant investment into the UK economy and the
club's supporters and local base can be sacrificed. 90 The role of the city
council to intervene is based on economic and social costs of the decision.
Surprisingly, given that ManU is the most famous brand from the region, the
Manchester City Council authorities are unmoved. ManU supporters attribute
this to local football politics, where city council officials traditionally support
a less successful football club.91
C. The Football Association (FA) and the Premier League
The FA and the Premier League regulate and organize football and major
competitions in which ManU participates. They have been perplexingly quiet.
86. See ADAM LEWIS & JONATHAN TAYLOR, SPORT: LAW AND PRACTICE 11-44 (2003). See
generally GRAYSON, supra note 4, at xx-xxi.
87. See generally LEWIS & TAYLOR, supra note 86.
88. See OFT Decision, THEFA.cOM, Aug. 1, 2003, http://www.thefa.com/
TheFA/NewsFromTheFA/Postings/2003/08/59488.htm (regarding fines imposed on Football
Authority and other bodies for price fixing of replica England shirts).
89. See supra Sections II.C. - ll.D.; see also infra Section III.E.
90. The view is indeed consistent with the utilitarian "business as usual" policy in England.
91. See Hall, supra note 8, at 23.
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92 Other than suggesting that there appears to be a complicated
misunderstanding of the issues, roles, and forces in contention, 93 or inferring
a quiet wink or nod exists in the transaction, the post-takeover comment of Mr.
Leonart Johansson, UEFA president, is noteworthy: "I can ask what the hell is
happening in England right now. It seems that the Premier League is taking
over everything." 94 In this light, a sufficient case appears to be built for
further external intervention or direct action by affected individuals and
groups.
D. The London Stock Exchange
There are fundamental questions about the role of the LSE in the ManU
saga. While the stock market lists certain products that may be associated
with clubs, it is clearly an issue whether a company, whose primary property is
a league affiliated and controlled football company, is naturally suitable for
the stock market. 95 Because the LSE has limited aims and powers and, in
general, will not assess parties' behaviors, there remains a predilection about
listing. 96 The ManU takeover experience confirms a narrow remit by the LSE
in football matters. On the other hand, there is a legitimate desire in football
circles that standards should be set and applied in approving hostile type
takeovers for football companies, particularly in light of a close and natural
relationship between clubs and the wider community. 97 The proper questions
about whether the takeover serves "the best interest of the sport" need to be
asked by the FA and the Premier League. Alternatively, the LSE could have
92. Domestic allegations of incompetence, outdated methods, and, at the same time, over
commercialization have been directed towards domestic English football authorities. See David
Owen, How to Manage a Country's Obsession, FIN. TIMES (London), May 17, 2005, at 13; see also
Hughes, supra note 14.
93. The websites of both associations do not contain information or comment on the events.
Requests for a position statement have yet been received. See The Football Association,
http://www.thefa.com (last visited Feb. 25, 2006); Premier League,
http://www.premierleague.com/fapl.rac?command=forwardonly&nextpage=homepage.
94. See Hughes, supra note 14.
95. In traditional jurisdictions, obligatory responsibilities under ISL, membership of leagues, and
the centralized hierarchy of authority restrain the freedom of initiative and commercial activity for
individual football clubs. See also O'Connor, supra note 42, at 38 (detailing critical remarks by FIFA
president, Mr. Sepp Blatter, about football clubs being listed on the stock exchange).
96. See Patrick Drayton, Regulatory Structures: The Relationship Between the Takeover Panel,
the FSA and the Courts, in TAKEOVERS IN ENGLISH AND GERMAN LAw 65-72 (Jennifer Payne ed.,
2002).
97. See Lambert, supra note 39; Glazer Lifts Manchester United Stake to 74.8 Pct, supra note 30
(stating that the Board of Directors of ManU had raised questions about how the interests of the
company and the remaining minority would be protected); cf Glazer Given Deadline on Man Utd,
BBC NEWS, Apr. 28, 2005, http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/business/4494159.stm.
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demanded financial guarantees before approving the offer.
In debating responsibility, the LSE's listings of ManU and other football
clubs presume a full awareness of the context and special nature of sport
business and a duty to promote or obey the rules. In other words, the LSE, in
regard to sport companies, is subject to Olympism. In failing to do so, the
LSE must bear pecuniary and non-pecuniary responsibility to disaffected
shareholders and supporter-stakeholders for breaches of ISL rules that caused
financial loss or led to the denial of access rights on the basis of voluntary
assumption of liability. 98 This claim would be strengthened if the LSE made
significant commissions or profits on the transaction. Overall, the institutional
nature and performance of the LSE justifies the earlier claim that the stock
market cannot be the sole and final judge of matters relating to football.
E. Conclusion - The Consequences of Laxitude
Professor Michie, in noting the downgrading of the public and community
interest objectives in English regulatory systems, indicts authorities for a
failure to act. In his analysis, only bankruptcy can save the club from the
present quagmire. 99 It may not be too late to act, and it would be better to do
so than to watch or let ManU become bankrupt.'00 There are plainly going to
be political repercussions if the diminished ManU brand has an impact on the
national and local economy. If it ever does, the Blair Premiership, the Labour
Party, and several Labour party candidates will, for a long time, bear the brunt.
It will probably be asked whether there arises liability toward the
shareholders or stakeholders as a result of failures to act. While no specific
answer is given here, it is certainly possible that professional associations may
be liable for breach of statutory duty, negligence, or breach of contract. In any
case, should directly responsible authorities fail, they risk the possibility of
losing control of the game and the sport. This situation will occur if Mr.
Glazer manages the club in a way that is inconsistent with established norms
and practices, leaving fans disillusioned.'10 For Mr. Glazer, knowing the
manner and the price of participation and ownership, these authorities cannot
question or restrain him from doing what he feels or knows best or at least
98. See White v. Jones, 2 A.C. 207 (H.L. 1995); Williams v. Natural Life Health Foods Ltd., 2
All E.R. 577 (H.L. 1998) (applying the voluntary assumption of responsibility rule in English law).
99. See Larsen, supra note 76; Michie, supra note 36; Owen, supra note 76; Man Utd Fans Vow
to Fight Takeover, supra note 32; see also Cole, Little Margin, supra note 60; O'Connor, supra note
63.
100. Cf infra Section V.
101. Cf David Owen, TV Concerns as Soccer Attendances Drop, FIN. TIMES (London), May 14,
2005, at 3.
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better than them. In these situations, particularly where there would be extra-
territorial impact, ISFs have the right to intervene to settle controversies and
disputes in the best interest of the sport.
IV. SUPPORTERS' OPTIONS - HOLDING BACK NO PUNCHES
A. Introduction
Broadly speaking, political, financial, commercial, and legal courses of
action are open to affected or disgruntled supporters. The specific options for
the supporters are to unravel the transaction, compete, or maintain their
participative shareholding interest and, consequently, stay on to challenge the
Glazers. Finally, the most difficult option is to switch loyalty to other clubs.
B. Transactional Unraveling by Political and Legal Action
Arising from a combination of factors, there is a "public interest" in the
Glazer affair.102 To unravel the transaction, shareholders' and supporters'
groups may officially write every member of Parliament and mayor asking the
government to take action, including requesting the Sport Minister or other
competent authority to review the action and make recommendations, if
appropriate, to the Competition Commission. Legal action is also an
appropriate step where cognizable interests are impinged. It is, however, a
necessary precondition that national and international regulators, as "guardians
of the sport," be notified and given a chance to take action before independent
action is commenced. Only if they fail, may supporters invoke proceedings in
a competent jurisdiction. 103
C. Independence and Competition
Before now, the need for supporters to have an independent financial plan
to promote, resist, protest, and support their activities had not been fully
explored. Because their wishes and rights have not been respected, supporters
may promote their participative interests by devising independent corporate,
commercial, and financial strategies. 104 In view of their specific concerns,
102. See generally supra Sections I.E., ll.B. - II.E., III.B., III.D - III.E.; see also infra Section
IV.D.
103. While there is only one valid applicable legal system, ISL or the lex sportiva, England and
Switzerland are alternative jurisdictions. The full or advisory jurisdiction of the Court of Arbitration
(CAS) may also be invoked.
104. In common law jurisdictions, competitive commercialization would not be a problem. The
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there is also a utilitarian justification in preventing the interests of seven men,
made up of Mr. Glazer and his sons, to prevail over the mass of global
supporters. In competing with the club commercially, efforts could be
directed toward affecting the club's revenue streams in relation to
merchandising and database rights. In relation to merchandising, the
independent supporters' association has indicated a desire to do the following:
(1) stop buying official merchandise of the club, (2) register its own
trademarks and logo, (3) create its own merchandising items, (4) franchise its
support base, and (5) seek sponsors.10 5 Further, it appears that supporters may
request that their names be taken off the database of ManU. They may create
their own database and commercially exploit it. If actions like these are
reproduced globally, they are bound to create an earthquake in the legal and
economic relationships of clubs and supporters.
D. "Abuse offRights" Claims
The abuse of rights doctrine may be invoked in relation to the way the
takeover was affected. 10 6 This may lead to refinement, annulment, or civil
liability. 107 Following acquisition, the doctrine will be an ISL watchdog to
control post-completion activities. Minority shareholders may invoke the
abuse of rights doctrine as part of the democratic consensus principle of
European sporting tradition. 10 8 Otherwise, the doctrine applies to property,
intellectual property, and contractual relations involving non-shareholders.
Further, the doctrine will apply to manners of corporate governance of a
sporting club. 10 9 Reports that minority shareholders will be denied a share of
dividends for principled opposition represents an instance of abuse of rights.
110 Though English law does not recognize a general abuse of rights doctrine,
right is promoted under the Statute of Monopolies (1624) and judicial development. See generally
Hodgkinson & Corby Ltd. v. Wards Mobility Servs. Ltd., F.S.R. 169, 174 (C.A. 1997); USGA v. St.
Andrews Sys., Data-Max, Inc., 749 F.2d. 1028 (3d Cir. 1984). In other jurisdictions, freedom of
association, enterprise, and protection of dignity provisions in human rights conventions and national
constitutions would have the same effect. See Cole, £88 Interest, supra note 60 (contributing £50
rather than watching matches would allow them to be able to buy back the club in five years).
105. Email from Nick Townle, Chairman, Manchester Independent Supporters Association (on
file with the author). Cf O'Connor, supra note 63, at 116.
106. See McCormack, supra note 57; cf supra Section II.B.
107. See supra Section I.B.
108. See generally Chapman, supra note 9; Hall, supra note 8, at 23.
109. The identifiable bases are Olympism's "sport family" concept (cf supra Section I.B.),
relational contracting obligations (cf Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis
of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271-318 (1992)), and improper
purpose (see Gambotto v. WCP Ltd. (1995) 182 CLR 432 (Austl.)).
110. See McCormack, supra note 57 (arguing that compulsory acquisition of shares following
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it must admit its application as a lex specialis known to sport law. IlI In any
case, Mr. Glazer's new team will find their future transnational dealings
subject to the abuse of rights doctrine. 112
E. Conclusion
Clearly, but unfortunately for him and other club proprietors, Mr. Glazer
has succeeded in irking supporters of clubs enough for them to consider
exercising their participative interests in sport and football governance through
various channels. The independent exercise of these rights and interests will
be necessary, particularly if there is governmental inaction. 113 This has
implications for exclusive control of the financial honey pot. The legitimate
exercise of such rights will be protected under applicable human rights
conventions and their domestic equivalents.
V. GIVING IT BACK TO THEM - THE GLAZER OPTIONS
A. Introduction
While in control, and irrespective of whatever personal or professional
opinion is held of Mr. Glazer and his past, it is proper to realistically assess
what good Mr. Glazer can do for his club and, indirectly, the sport. 114
Particularly effective responses will give the skeptics a black eye in exchange
for a bloody nose.
B. Woo or Fight the Supporters
It is reasonable to believe that Mr. Glazer will fight back to retain the huge
support base and inspire supporters' confidence in his management ability. 115
takeovers is incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights provision guaranteeing a
right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions. English law, he contends, has a well balanced approach
to refuse support to such intentions).
111. See supra Section I.B. This arises as a result of its qualification as an enforceable custom or
customary law of the lex specialis. Cf Roy Goode, Usage and its Reception in Transnational
Commercial Law, 46 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. I (1997).
112. See supra Section I.B. See generally INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF
PRIVATE LAW, supra note 58.
113. See supra Section III.B.; cf Michie, supra note 36.
114. Cf Cole, Little Margin, supra note 60; Michie, supra note 36.
115. See Nick Harris, Glazer Plans £100m War Chest, INDEP. (London), May 23, 2005, at 77
(stating there was no formal commitment by Mr. Glazer to fight back); Ingrid Mansell & Ashling
O'Connor, Revealed: Glazer's Plan for Manchester United, TIMES (London), June 10, 2005, at 1;
Ingrid Mansell & Ashling O'Connor, Ticket Prices Rise, Transfer Cash Kept to £25M, Income
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There are options open to him in this regard. First, he may avoid
disappointing critics and experts by avoiding fee increases, so as not to be seen
as exploiting the customers. Second, he needs to involve supporters'
representatives in aspects of the management, thereby ensuring good faith
compliance with the ISL doctrine and respecting the participative rights of
supporters. Third, Mr. Glazer should begin and activate a process of wooing
new supporters in order to fund his ventures and balance the power and
influence of the present strand of supporters. Fourth, it is possible to develop
classes of shareholding rights for a new supporters' structure consisting of
varying privileges and responsibilities. A formal, jointly-developed
supporters' charter would be welcomed. Finally, whether wooing or fighting
the supporters, Mr. Glazer owes it to the supporters to officially disclose how
he intends to pay the staggering interest reportedly associated with his bid and
what the supporters will gain from his involvement. Other than a reliable
scoop, these issues have not been dealt with. 116
C. Maximize the Profit Objective
First, given the amount paid and the sources, Mr. Glazer has the prime
motive to settle his debts and make a profit as soon as possible. In the face of
competition from independent supporters and other clubs, one expects to begin
to hear and see an unleashing of the "power of profit-motive" at work. In
general, this will mean utilizing intellectual property (IPR) related rights,
commercial property rights, and sport property rights to expand the ManU
brand. Merchandising and licensing will therefore be actively featured in Mr.
Glazer's scheme of things. At the same time, the Glazers have the
corresponding duty not to over flog or destroy the brand's power.11 7 The
power must not be used or abused in a manner inconsistent with ISL or
national values.
Second, the development of IPR related rights, involving literary, musical,
Forced up, TIMES (London), June 10, 2005, at 8 [hereinafter Mansell & O'Connor, Ticket Prices
Rise]; Ashling O'Connor, Business Will be Run as Family Affair, TIMES (London), June 10, 2005, at
9; see also Louise Taylor, Glazer Tells Fans Not to Worry, GUARDIAN (London), July 2, 2005, at 11.
116. See Cole, £88m Interest, supra note 60; Mansell & O'Connor, Ticket Prices Rise, supra
note 115; cf Sullivan, supra note 30; supra Section III.C. - 1II.D. See generally Matthew Garrahan,
Interest on United Deal Could Spell £894m Debt for Glazer, FIN. TIMES (London), May 17, 2005, at
21; Harris, supra note 115.
117. This duty survives with remaining minority shareholders but will disappear if Mr. Glazer
assumes 100% ownership of the shares. On the other hand, too many marketing and branding devices
may diminish the commercial interests of existing sponsors. See Kevin Roberts, The Week that Was.
. , SPORTBUSINESS.COM, May 27, 2005, http://www.sportbusiness.com/news/index?newsitemid=
157657.
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and cinematographic works based on the rich historical and sporting pedigree
of ManU, and its global goodwill, if combined with Olympism values,
Olympic partners, and capable entrepreneurs, may be a radical profit-
generating innovation. 118 These rights may be auctioned or licensed.
Third, the international franchising of the football club in the U.S., Japan,
and China appears to be a possibility. We may, in the future, hear of ManU
Buccaneers SC, ManU Tigers FC, and ManU Dragons FC. 119 It may be
possible to have agreements with the franchised clubs concerning player
transfers, IPR claims, broadcasting rights, or friendly matches.
Fourth, the development and acquisition of broadcasting rights is also a
matter of potential interest. It is not possible to upset the collective selling
arrangement for official competitions in England, 120 or for that matter, the
exclusive control held by UEFA and FIFA to broadcasting rights. 121 The
broadcasting rights that appear plausible are friendly games involving ManU.
However, the club may acquire rights to national team matches to generate
interest. With respect to new opportunities, it is debatable the extent to which
the sale of media rights will flourish under the laws of football or Europe. In
any case, this is only possible where, as in Italian and Spanish football clubs,
there are superstar players. 122 ManU presently has a limited attraction of
players, one of which, on the basis of on and off the field conduct, is a
potential liability.
D. Seek Additional Sponsors and Partners
Sponsorship has been a viable, but increasingly cluttered marketing
concept in national sport. In international sport, it still remains viable. Sport
and club sponsorship rights are vital to lowering costs and maximizing
118. Cf Erik Kirschbaum, Real Madrid Film Draws Cannes Market Buzz, YAHoo.coM, May 11,
2005, http://in.news.yahoo.com/050511/137/5yi86.html.
119. SC means Soccer Club. This arises because of the different sport called "football" in the
U.S. To denominate the American connection, the Glazers may call franchised clubs "SC." The local
football federation may of course refuse this. It also places risks on the teams. Cf supra Section
II.D.
120. See Re Television Premier League Football Matches E.M.L.R. 78 (R.P.C. 2000); Taylor,
supra note 115, at 11 (reporting no breakaway television deal); see also LEWIS & TAYLOR, supra note
86, at 405-10; Murray Urges Glazer Not to Get Greedy, supra note 12; cf Davies & Garrahan,
Glazer Claims His United Prize, supra note 5 (reporting that ManU is seeking to exploit overseas
rights to competitions); Matthew Garrahan, Will Manchester Utd Walk Alone into the Tunnel of Sole
Broadcast Rights?, FT.cOM, May 2, 2005, http://news.ft.com/home/us; David Smith, Fan Fury Over
Glazer, SPORTBUSINESS.COM, May 13, 2005, http://www.sportbusiness.com/
news/index?newsitemid= 157511.
121. LEWIS & TAYLOR, supra note 86, at 410-11.
122. Cf David Owen, Money Machine, FT.cOM, May 2, 2005, http://news.fl.com/home/us.
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revenue rights. Division of sponsorship rights and contracts may be exploited
on the basis of the brand recognition of ManU so that, conceivably, there will
be regional or national sponsorship agreements. The role of technological
partners to develop images and games, based on training and competitive
matches, will be vital. Licensed partnerships with gyms, healthcare resorts,
and sport medicine makers will be vital revenue sources.
E. "Abuse of Rights "Actions
A wild, abusive, or irresponsible expression by supporters of their
participative interests may give rise to the invocation of abuse of rights related
actions where supporters exercise their rights, promote violence, or support or
preach national or race based discrimination contrary to ISL. The doctrine
may also be utilized to limit excesses associated with rights to launch
competitive CPR or IPR based products. As shareholders, it is possible to
have their participative rights and interests determined where the exercise is
not in the best interest of the sport or the club. 123 One justification for this is
that their actions may diminish the proprietary value and the goodwill of the
club, as well as place the club under criminal sanctions at home or abroad. 124
F. Conclusion
In the coming months a lot will be revealed by the actions of the Glazers.
The possibilities no doubt are varied. With a combination of luck and
dynamic management, there is a wide scope for financial and sporting glory
that would literally leave Mr. Glazer's critics with a black eye.
125
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The ManU takeover is a significant manifestation of sport globalization.
123. Since fans and supporters who preach and support violence may be expelled from a club,
there is no reason why their pecuniary interests in a club cannot be equally determined. Cf Oliver
Kay, Riot Over, Its Business as Usual, Glazers Tell United, TIMES (London), July 1, 2005, at 104.
124. "We shouldn't throw things or adopt abusive language because the law is designed to
protect property and the sensibilities of cultured people. But we can all shout very loudly." Cf
Chapman, supra note 9. Mr. David Gill laments the "small minority of people who are doing the
name of the club a disservice." Kay, supra note 123.
125. In a recent MUTV television interview, Mr. Joel Glazer provided six policy steps. He
declared the following: (1) that he was change resistant and would not tamper with the club's
heritage, (2) that true ownership would rest with the fans and that his family would be restorers, (3)
that there would be no pricing out of supporters, (4) that there would be no sale of Old Trafford, the
sporting ground, (5) that there was no breakaway television deal, and (6) that overseas activities may
be looked at to benefit the community at large. See Kay, supra note 123; Taylor, supra note 115.
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Its undiluted success will have profound long-term consequences for the sport.
In light of its impact, certain general and specific conclusions can be made.
They are discussed respectively in this part.
A. General Conclusions
First, in the relationship between globalization and ISL, ISL dominates
with fundamental doctrines applicable to the acquisition and management of
clubs. These doctrines, namely Olympism, good faith, commerce, access, and
abuse of rights ensure that access, merit, justice, and fairness prevail in
proprietary transactions and relationships. Second, under ISL's regime,
entrepreneurs and supporters have legal rights and responsibilities.
Consequently, there is no scope for untrammeled globalization. Third, the
coherent nature of a transnational ISL has demonstrated an independent and
effective body of norms, which is applicable when national law is lacking or
national bodies are ineffective. Fourth, it has been shown that breaches of ISL
may lead to the intervention of international sport authorities that have an
interest. ISFs have an inherent responsibility under the "best interest of the
sport" and the "good of the game powers" to intervene. Finally, supporters'
independent rights to undertake generated revenue out of their activities in
connection with the club have emerged. In rising to the challenge, all
independent supporters will discover oil under their feet.
B. Specific Conclusions
As a well-loved sport philanthropist and former football club owner
declared, "the bigger the head, the bigger the headache." 126 There are bound
to be difficulties in hostile or semi-hostile takeovers of established clubs,
particularly if objecting supporters will be reined in to new organizational and
marketing regimes. This analysis reveals specifically that, while certain ISL
doctrines promote the activities of entrepreneurs like Mr. Glazer, the process
of acquisition of ManU is fraught with non-compliance with fundamental ISL
doctrines, particularly Olympism, fair play, and abuse of sport rights. First,
the resistance by ManU supporters is contextually legitimate if it is aimed at
glocalisation, based on Olympism, and represents an attempt to find their own
bearing in an age of globalization. However, in cases of wild and excessive
behavior, the infraction of the abuse of rights doctrine is possible. Second,
there are serious global takeover risks. These have not been examined within
the UK due to the nonchalant attitude of national officials and authorities.
126. About Chief Moshood Abiola, http://www.kind.org/mko-biography.html (last visited Mar.
12, 2006).
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Third, having obtained the control of the club, new and multiple commercial
and proprietary options are open to Mr. Glazer. The club's "Old Trafford"
headquarters and the "Theatre of Dreams" may become the most exciting
originator for football-related action and transactions. Finally, while the
parties' actions indicate that there is more to it than the love of the club, it is
possible to use Olympism, the specialized feng shui of sport, to exercise the
anger, jealousy, greed, fear, and ill wishes that surround the club's takeover
aura.

